The Effectiveness of Peace Keeping Yugoslavia and Cambodia Essay Sample free essay sample

Introduction The United Nations peace maintaining mission is a broard phenomenon that encompasses a figure of peace maintaining activities. When the UN started affecting in peace maintaining activities. the operations were chiefly centered around seting UN forces on international boundary lines or cease fire lines with the purpose of maintaining isolated parties in struggle by positioning UN military perceivers or soldiers to play the function of 3rd parties. The whole thought behind this is to convey about a arrest in belligerencies. quiet down tenseness. make the necessary ambiance required for dialogues so that a permanent solution to struggles may be arrived at. However. over clip. at that place have new developments that have pushed frontward the range of UN peace maintaining activities. These developments came with the terminal of the Cold War and the comparative success in the Gulf War during the early 1990s. These developments produced a new universe order in footings of international political relations and this new order was spearheaded by the western powers led by the USA. [ 1 ] This farther broadened the function the UN have to play in keeping peace and stableness. particularly as peace was now regarded in footings of sustainability and measure. Furthermore. the fact that most of the struggles are fought by paramilitary groups and non the national ground forcess. have made civilians the victims. It is this state of affairs that has drawn the attending of the international community to look in to the affair. [ 2 ] Therefore recent developments like these have made UN peace maintaining missions to hold a wider scope of activities to manage. of which failure in any of these activities could intend failure in the peace maintaining operation. Some of these activities include disarming. demobilisation of military personnels and armed paramilitary groups. publicity of national rapprochement. Restoration of effectual authoritiess. organisation and monitoring of elections. proviso of support for human-centered assistance mission. bodyguard of alleviation convoys and the protection of safe countries. [ 3 ] This essay will look at two states where UN peace maintaining missions have been operational with accent on whether the missions were successful or non and the grounds for the success or failure. The impact created by the result of these operations will besides be taken into consideration. The survey will concentrate on the UN peace maintaining mission in the 1990s. The two states that will be discus sed in this paper will be the former Yugoslavia and Cambodia. UN PEACE KEEPING IN FORMER YUGOSLAVIA Background. The Yugoslavian struggle is one of those struggles around the universe where the UN embarked on a peace maintaining mission to assist reconstruct order in the state. The state situated in the Balkans and over 500 old ages. different European powers including Turkey have greatly influenced the political developments taking topographic point in the part. However. the possible posed by a united Serbia and montenegro in the eyes of other European powers and the USA became important in the eruption of struggle in the state. [ 4 ] During the old ages 1991-1992. there was tenseness in the state due to secessionist inclinations that had developed over old ages. As a consequence. the European community got involved in the affair with the hope of at least happening a temporal solution. In the procedure. the Badinter Commission was established to analyze the freshly emerging provinces if they were feasible for independency by European community criterions. Some of the working usher lines for th is committee included commissariats for the protection of the rights of minority groups. [ 5 ] The commission’s study ruled that Slovenia with a big population of Slovenes was feasible for independency while Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia were ruled out. In malice this. coupled with long standing German force per unit area. the USA and the European community went in front to declare their acknowledgment for Croatia and Bosnia Herzegovina. It was this incident that pushed the state in to chaos. In this regard. the European community as it was known at the clip and the USA hold the incrimination for the immediate cause of belligerencies in that part during that period. With the Yugoslavia in pandemonium. European authoritiess and USA blamed Serbia for blockading peace throughout the part. [ 6 ] It was this state of affairs that drew the attending of UN Security Council to keep that Serbia has something to make with the Croatia. This was through the UN Security Council declaration puting up UNPROFOR which amongst other things held â€Å"the United Nations military personn els and constabularies would be deployed in certain countries of Croatia. designated as United Nations Protected Areas ( UNPAs ) ; the UNPAs would be countries in which the Secretary-General judged that particular agreements were required during an interim period †¦ they would be countries in which Serbs constitute the bulk or a significant minority of the population †¦Ã¢â‚¬  . The UN peace maintaining operation in this instance ran abruptly of many facets. Troubles One facet that has received a batch of unfavorable judgments in the UN peace maintaining mission in the former Yugoslavia has been the period when the operation was launched. The UN peace maintaining mission in Yugoslavia arrived some months after struggle erupted in the state. A mission of that nature needed some clip for readyings to be carried out. Equally shortly as struggle erupted. the UN organized a preliminary unit of ammunition of dialogues with the military leadings of the parties involved in the struggle. These dialogues were chaired by Cyrus Vanoe. a senior staff of the UN Secretariat. Even before Vanoe submitted his study there were indicants that there have been a figure of important issues where differences in their reading were already predominating. [ 7 ] A state of affairs like this meant things were traveling to be hard because differences that could non be settled on tabular array could merely be settled at the war forepart. But this state of affairs was ignored w ith the hope that they may vanish while the peace keepers were transporting out their mission. The UN Secretary General even went farther to declare that there were serious possibilities that the mission would neglect and this was based on certain facets amongst them deficiency of cooperation from parties. Besides. the mode in which the UNPROFOR was designed for the mission in former Yugoslavia was non suited for an operation of that quality. Designed as traditional forces. it became clear from the beginning that none of the parties. that is the Croatian or the Karijna Serbs desired to collaborate with the UN forces. For case. the UN protected Areas were neer demilitarized as demanded. the cease fire organized neer achieved its full significance. many people stayed displaced and lawlessness became the order of the twenty-four hours. [ 8 ] Alternatively the UNPAs alternatively helped to make more confusion in the part as these so called protected countries were now functioning as roots for armed incursions in to Bosnia. The Krajina Serbs saw UNPROFOR. as a force that could assist rush up their ain independency. while Croatia saw the UN presence as an a opportunity to mobilise and forcefully take over these UNPAs. [ 9 ] It is hence non surprising that in 1995. Croatia seized three of the four UNPAs and by mid 1995 Croatia taken control of the UNPA Sector to its West. Another country where the peace maintaining mission in Yugoslavia had loop holes was the deficiency of consideration for the developments that had taken topographic point during the period when the Vanoe program was approved in 1991 to the period in February1992. when Secretary General’s study puting up the peace maintaining mission came to being. This once more was the consequence of the speedy deployment of UN peace keepers in the state. These developments had greatly altered some basic characteristics of the Vanoe program yet no considerations were given to modify the original program so that it suits the new worlds. [ 10 ] For case. the peace maintaining mission caput quarters had no 1 on its staff that was present during dialogues. hence there was cipher who knew the places taken by the combatants in the peace maintaining mission office. This was a serious reverse back to the peace maintaining procedure because at the initial stages the UNPROFOR hierarchy found it hard to construe and react right the places the parties had taken. A state of affairs like this meant the peace maintaining procedure was traveling to be complex. [ 11 ] For case Serbian boundaries had been altered comparing to what was in the Vanoe Plan and even extended beyond the boundaries of municipalities. Furthermore. the fact that Serb boundaries had changed beyond what was in the Vanoe made it hard for the peace maintaining mission to win. These countries were now combative countries particularly during the period when the UNPROFOR was seeking to cover with the parties involved I the struggle. The ground for this is that as the war progressed some of these countries were given the position of pink zone under Serbian control. Croatia did non welcome this move and the ground for this is that Croatia and Slovenia had merely been recognized as independent province by the European Community and the USA. [ 12 ] This facet of acknowledgment gave sovereignty to the Croatian boundary lines particularly in the eyes of Croats. It was on these bases that Croatian governments stood on the point that the Krajina Serbs had no base and hence urge UN peacekeepers non to cover with them. Although the Serbs had a point. their place clashed with the Vanoe Plan which held that an interim understanding will steer the deployment of forces in countries considered as UN protected countries until a concluding declaration is taken at the European Community summit on Yugoslavia. All these hard came as a consequence of deficiency of sufficient readying for the mission and the fact there was no representative of the peacekeeping force commanding officers during the early phases of dialogues. Another country of trouble in the UN peace maintaining mission in Yugoslavia came as a consequence f the out interruption of civil war in Bosnia Herzegovina. This civil war was nil but an extra undertaking for the UNPROFOR to manage and this was ulterior term â€Å"mission creep† . This new development pushed the UN Security Council to widen its committedness to the part between June and December 1992. Among these committednesss were deployment in Bosnia-Herzegovina for bodyguard of human-centered assistance convoys ; monitoring of demilitarization of the Prevlaka peninsula ; deployment of perceivers at landing fields and monitoring of the â€Å"no-fly zone† over Bosnia-Herzegovina. control of the Peruca dike ; and preventative deployment in Macedonia. [ 13 ] In fact this state of affairs was a monolithic blow on the peace maintaining mission. First the resources that were needed for this operation were non available or were merely available when the state of affairs they were meant to cover with had wholly changed. In other words most of the declarations for this mission remained on paper in what was considered every bit good drafted declarations. In add-on when the civil war erupted in Bosnia-Herzegovina. the UNPROFOR was still fighting to put up for the mission in Croatia. Furthermore. during the early period of struggle in Bosnia Herzegovina. the UNPROFOR had non been given authorization to carryout peace maintaining mission in the state. [ 14 ] With this sort of complications. the peace maintaining mission in former Yugoslavia was bound to be in existent troubles. As UNPROFOR operations progressed. it shortly became apparent that shared duty between the United Nations and the European Community was an unsatisfactory agreement. to set it really mildly. UNPROFOR’s experience showed that when state of affairss emerged where positive consequences appeared likely. the European Community came on the scene in the hope of pulling recognition. but the minute things went incorrectly. UNPROFOR was left to pick up the pieces ; an art the force bit by bit came to maestro. in so far as enduring the flack catcher directed at it was concerned. In due class. with the instead doubtful agreements that were put in topographic point for Bosnia-Herzegovina. it was inevitable that transcripts of studies. analyses. and recommendations emanating from UNPROFOR central offices began happening their manner to Brussels. some national capitals. and the office of the European Community negotiant. [ 15 ] The irritating and unacceptable portion of this development was that. utilizing such information. efforts were made to get at agreements with the combatants without confer withing UNPROFOR ; in most instances with black consequences. [ 16 ] The death of the UN forces in former Yugoslavia came in May 1995 when Bosnian Serbs retaliated with a series of air work stoppages in response to the bombardment of about half a twelve sand traps where they stored their ammo. This catastrophe pushed universe leaders to the decision that the state of affairs in Bosnia-Herzegovina could non be managed through ordinary peace maintaining. This apprehension sealed the religion of UNPROFOR. As a consequence. the UNPROFOR was instantly withdrawn from the part. Unfortunately. the operations in the former Yugoslavia have been characterized by a grade of symbolism. rhetoric. and lip service for which a heavy monetary value has been paid in footings of human lives and agony as both the UN military personnels and the local population bore most of the effects. As armed traditional groups sent to countries covered by cultural struggles. UN forces became capable to use by challenging parties. For illustration the Bosnian Serbs in one juncture and under the screen of peace maintaining construct to some 370 UN peace keepers surety and were to be used as human shields. In add-on. the UNPROFOR forces neer succeeded to forestall the Bosnia Serbs from perpetrating cultural cleaning and race murder which had become so prevailing during this period. All these conveying one to the decision that the UN peace maintaining mission in Yugoslavia was in the terminal a failure. Cambodia Background. Although the UN peace maintaining mission in Cambodia merely took off in 1992. the state had been in turbulency of all time since the 1970s. Cambodia from 1975 to 1979 was ruled by the Khmer Rouge with Pol Pot as their leader. This Maoist totalitarian government was ill-famed for killing Cambodians. During the period 1975 to 1979. it has been estimated that about one million people lost their lives. [ 17 ] In 1979. Khmer Rouge brought the state in to turmoil following its incursions in to Vietnam. These Khmer Rouge incursions pushed Vietnam to occupy Cambodia. trail the Khmer Rouge up the Mountain ranges to the West of the state. Vietnam so installed a puppet communist authorities under the Cambodian People’s Party ( CPP ) . The Vietnamese invasion in Cambodia pushed the part in to confusion as the CCP proved non any better than the Khmer Rouge. The CCP got involved in a series of atrociousnesss that caused 1000s of Cambodians to fly the state for safe. As a consequence Thailand which was appeared to be the chief finish for those fleeing Cambodians felt threaten. China felt besides felt uncomfortable with Vietnam’s control of Cambodia. Furthermore. merely the Soviet axis recognized the CCP authorities in Vietnam. [ 18 ] This non-recognition of the CCP authorities pushed the Khmer Rouge in to an confederation with some non-communist parties in Cambodia. the monarchist FUNCINPEC party. led by Prince Norodom Sihanouk. and the Kampuchean National Liberation Front ( KPNLF ) . [ 19 ] The move paid off when the confederation managed to procure a place at the UN in 1982. All these helped to transfuse an ambiance of force in Cambodia and it was this state of affairs that attracted the attending of the UN. In revenge to these developments. the UN sponsored a conference in Paris in with the purpose to seek a solution to the Kampuchean struggle. The result was the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia ( UNTAC ) . SUCCESSES AND FAILURES Of UNTAC UNTAC efficaciously excessively up maps in Cambodia in 1992 and this was considered to be a portion of the Paris Agreement. UNTAC was deployed in 1992 as portion of the 1991 Paris Agreements. From the really get downing. UNTAC had a hard mission to carry through in Cambodia. Some of UNTAC’s responsibilities included supervising a armistice among the parties involved. conduct national elections. guarantee proper conditions for the repatriation of refugees and more significantly to see in to it that the power of Kampuchean authorities was used in a just mode before and during the elections. [ 20 ] To carry through this undertaking. 1. 6 billion SU dollars and a 22. 000 adult male expanded peace maintaining force was deployed from March 1992 to September 1993. UNTAC engagement in Cambodia was successful in certain facet particularly repatriating Kampuchean refugees. it rebuilt substructure and conducted a national election. The organisation of national election was possibly UNTAC’s most successful accomplishment in Cambodia. UNTAC was outstanding in its attempts to accomplish a monolithic enrollment of campaigners specifically through its monolithic and countrywide electors enrollment undertaking. UNTAC even went farther to destabilise CPP attempt to kill opposing CPP parliamentary campaigners. These were chiefly campaigners from the FUNCINPEC party. of Prince Norodom Sihanouk. The election remains a bequest to Kampuchean people and their long standing aspiration to hold a democratic province. During the election. more than 90 ­ % of the legible electors cued up to take their leaders is spite chance of possible onslaughts from the Khmer Rouge and the CPP. These elections were won by FUNCINPEC but the CPP remained inexorable and even endanger to throw the state in to a civil war if a portion of power was non handed over. This CPP place was looked in to by the international community under the protections of the USA. They up with the position that instead than allow the state to chaos it would be better to set force per unit area on the FUNCINPEC. who accepted to organize a alliance authorities with the CPP. The CPP was so given the station of 2nd premier curate while the FUNCINPEC kept the station of first premier curate. However. success was non in all facets. One of UNTAC’s really important missions to Cambodia was neer truly achieved. UNTAC found it really hard to oblige parties to to the full stay by the commissariats of the cease-fire understanding. For case. the Khmer Rouge was neer disarmed. and even refused to let UN forces entree in to the countries they controlled. The CCP was besides non wholly disarmed. The CCP even refused to collaborate with the UN to see in to it that there was neutrality in the Kampuchean authorities with respects to bureaucratism during and after the elections that were to be organized. [ 21 ] The ground for this was partially because UNTAC. as a visible radiation armed maintaining force. merely like the instance of UNPROFOR in former Yugoslavia. did non hold what it required that the authorization nor the armaments that could assist force the warring cabals to accept the regulations of the authorization. The consequence was that UNTAC’s achievements began to melt out shortly after it withdrew . Today fraud and corruptness and repression remain an built-in portion of life in Cambodia. Another country where UNTAC remained missing in the Kampuchean operation was in it inability to oversee the authorities of Cambodia particularly in 1992 when it looked like the authorities could collaborate with the UN. This was sad because when UNTAC became ready to take up this challenge. the CPP was no longer ready to collaborate. In malice this UNTAC was still able to look into the CCP in early 1993 with the consequence that a verification was issued keeping the CPP responsible for utilizing the authorities bureaucratism to transfuse force against the resistance and scare the electorate. [ 22 ] In fact the CPP force became so unfastened in 1993 to the extent that the FUNCINPEC threatened to halt it cooperation with UNTAC. In add-on. in early 1994. UNTAC left Cambodia and their going was a cogent evidence of how ephemeral their successes were in the state. For case. the inability of UNTAC’s to wholly demilitarize the Khmer Rouge and the CPP remained an indicant that the backdown of UN peace maintaining could probably co-occur with the eruption of force in the state. In add-on. in the period taking to the elections. the UN did non free forces of the civil disposal and this had serious reverberations. Most of the forces refused to release their places after the election after their party lost the elections. Some merely refused to pay commitment to Prince Ranariddh who became the first Prime Minister. The CPP subsequently used the alliance to construct its political power. isolate FUNCINPEC. and enroll Khmer Rouge members and leaders. The CPP staged a violent putsch in July 1997 that drove Ranariddh out of the state and killed his top Plutos. This action spurred theNew York Timesto aggressively rep robate the Clinton administration’s Cambodia policy in a July 10. 1997 column. From the conceptual point of position. the UNTAC expedition to Cambodia was even far more deficient. To be gin with. the mission placed heavy trust on the apprehension that they would hold high degree cooperation with the parties involved in the struggle. This impression was derived based on the thought that warring cabals normally cooperated with peace maintaining missions judging from earlier traditions. The mission wholly ignored the fact that assorted parts have their distinctive features therefore one can non wholly trust on the experiences of one state of affairs to work out another. This partially explains the point that while UNTAC believed that warring parties would follow. the CPP had a wholly different position of the affair. Alternatively the CPP neer had any purpose to give up power an in the procedure all the CPP did was to thwart UNTAC’s attempts. [ 23 ] The Khmer Rouge seemingly had no purpose of to the full collaborating with UNTAC and this partially explains why it did non take part in the in national elections. Whatever the instance. UNTAC has to gain some credits for the manner it managed this peculiar state of affairs. The point is that UNTAC took to honour a really important and traditional regulation of peace maintaining which hold that peace keepers must avoid the usage of force if parties refuse to esteem peace understandings and UNTAC did merely that. The determination to remain calm prevented the surpluss of Khmer Rouge from transforming in to violence thereby seting UNTAC in the same place as the other Kampuchean battlers. This determination helped to restrict the figure casualties on the side of the peacekeeping forces. UNTAC besides had the foresight to restrict the function of certain peacekeeping military personnels. particularly Americans and Japanese that might arouse warring parties. The 49 American soldiers who served in UNTAC were limited to observer functions in unafraid countries. Japan’s 605 military personnels were restricted to observer mission in peaceable cou ntries and edifice roads. Another conceptual job faced by UNTAC and which appeared to be really important was the intent for the mission. It was non truly clear whether UNTAC’s mission to Cambodia was merely to ease peace. conduct national elections. and quickly withdraw or the other manus whether the mission had a duty to keep a longer-term presence and see through Cambodia’s passage to democracy. [ 24 ] This issue was neer decently looked in to by the UNTAC policy shapers. These policy shapers underestimated the mission and hence they to the full took to the consideration that election will be smooth and the parties will to the full collaborate. In add-on UN functionaries likewise those of President Clinton neer hesitated when it came to rapid backdown no considerations were given for the mode or scheme for issue. In a similar mode UNTAC besides relied to a great extent on the influence of foreigners like China. the United States. France. Thailand. and Indonesia. However this move proved to be a assorted approval particularly as outside power played a typical function in conveying those in difference to the negotiating tabular array. It became clear that if force per unit area was increased on the CPP. Russia was Russia would respond. UNTAC’s disconnected backdown in late 1993 was influenced by the Clinton disposal. which knew that the force was fall ining and viewed the possible failure of such a big and expensive peacekeeping mission as a public dealingss catastrophe that would destine its ambitious UN-based foreign policy. Therefore. elections were held despite the fact that UNTAC had non met most of its authorization. It was so rapidly withdrawn to give the UN and the United States the chance to declare triumph before pandemonium returned. This was an unfortunate policy determination. since there was a opportunity that if UNTAC remained through 1994 it might hold been able to complete what it started and increased the chances for democratic authorities. This was a mistake Clinton functionaries tried non to do several old ages subsequently when they helped plan what are basically occupation forces to turn to civil and cultural crises in Bosnia. Kosovo. and East Timor. Administrative and concatenation of bid jobs besides plagued UNTAC. sabotaging its effectivity and repute. UNTAC was the most expensive and most ambitious operation the UN of all time attempted. It had no coherent program to pull off such a big project. The UN peace maintaining mission in Cambodia besides suffered a series of bid jobs even though these did non ensue to any incidents. The ground for no casualties in malice this lack was because of the determination by warring cabals to avoid confrontations with UN peace keepers. However. Gallic and Dutch military personnels in certain occasions went beyond their instructions and used force against the Khmer Rouge while France on many juncture refused to deploy its forces as instructed by UNTAC. All these came as a consequence of the concatenation of bid jobs UNTAC suffered in the class of the mission. Finally. condemnable activity by UNTAC military personnels. particularly black marketeering and harlotry. tinted UNTAC and the UN’s repute in the eyes of the international community. UNTAC military personnels who had been sponsoring cocottes introduced AIDS to remote countries of Cambodia. Some UNTAC military personnels operated whorehouses and chancing halls. In decision. UNTAC did better than some expanded peacekeeping missions. It brought peace to Cambodia for a clip. helped refugees and displaced individuals return. and created more stable conditions that saved lives. The major error made by UNTAC contrivers was undervaluing the undertaking at manus. If UNTAC contrivers had a better construct of the political state of affairs in Cambodia and a more realistic position of how to construct democracy. this $ 1 billion–plus expanded peacekeeping attempt might hold left a fledgling democracy in its topographic point alternatively of a corrupt autarchy that stays in power by terrorising the population and its political oppositions. [ 25 ] Cambodia in recent times has been credited for being more peaceable than was the instance before the intercession of the UN in 1992. Prince Ranariddh. the former first Prime Minister of the CPP/FUNCINPEC alliance who was overthrown in a military putsch agreed to return to the state and countryside upset is said to hold reduced enormously. However. behind the drapes Kampuchean political relations remain the same as the CCP leader Hun Sen remains a autocrat and his party dominates about all facets of political relations in the state. [ 26 ] This is because the party remains comparatively united in comparing with the other parties. Furthermore. the CPP is ready to take what of all time major it takes to maintain the FUNCINPEC its chief opposing under control. In the same way. FUNCINPEC has lost much of the strength and influence it one time enjoyed during the 1990s as a consequence of internal combat. However. the biggest factor that undermined FUNCINPEC was the implosion of the Khmer Rouge. which had been working as its military arm. Without the Khmer Rouge military menace. FUNCINPEC was much easier for the CPP to force around. [ 27 ] The present state of affairs is non what was expected by the international community when it took to acquire involved in the struggle. However. it remains apparent that the scheme employed by the CPP in the late 1990s has been remained attached to the fact that the Clinton disposal did non cover with certain CPP mischievousness that would hold helped to warrant the success UNTAC operations in Cambodia. [ 28 ] In 1998. the first national elections were held since UNTAC’s backdown. The elections. in which the CPP won. were conducted wholly by CPP forces and were widely condemned in the Western media. Former UNTAC Commander John Sanderson and Michael Maley. an UNTAC functionary who helped form the 1993 elections. contended in a damning article that the 1998 elections were non free and just and that Cambodia is basically an autocratic province where the destiny of the state remains in the custodies of the CCP. It has been a hard undertaking to depict this week’s military ejector of Cambodia’s First Prime Minister. Norodom Ranariddh. by his alliance spouse and longtime challenger. Second Prime Minister Hun Sen. Simply naming it a putsch would convey an automatic suspension of American assistance to the state. The Clinton Administration feared such instant detachment would cut down instead than increase United States purchase. Whatever the instance the ictus of power by Mr. Hun Sen’s bloody putsch is has proved to be a immense set back to democracy and a misdemeanor of the 1991 Paris understanding that ended the Kampuchean civil war. Most of all. it is a catastrophe for Cambodia. From the above one realizes that the UN peace maintaining mission in former Yugoslavia was a failure in many facets. Comparing this to the Kampuchean instance it becomes apparent that there was some grade of success sing that the mission in Cambodia at least succeeded to form elections and put in a democratic authorities before go forthing the state. Beginnings Thakur. Ramesh.United Nations Peacekeeping Operationss: Ad Hoc Missions. Permanent Engagement.United Nations University Press: New York. 2001. Fleitz. Frederick H. Jr. .Peacekeeping Fiascoes of the ninetiess: Causes. Solutions. and U. S. Interests. Praeger: Westport. 2002. David. Charters A. ( ed. ) . Peacekeepingand the Challenge of Conflict Resolution.New Brunswick: University of New Brunswick. 1994. Donald. Daniel C. F.U. S. Perspectives on Peacekeeping: Puting PDD-25 in Context. Strategic Research Department. Research Memorandum 3-94. Newport. Rhode island: U. S. Naval War College. 1994. [ 1 ] Ramesh Thakur. United Nations Peacekeeping Operationss: Ad Hoc Missions. Permanent Engagement. ( United Nations University Press: New York. 2001 ) . P. 165 [ 8 ] Frederick H. Fleitz Jr. .Peacekeeping Fiascoes of the ninetiess: Causes. Solutions. and U. S. Interests. ( Praeger: Westport. 2002 ) . P. 129. [ 10 ] Charters. David A. ( ed. ) . Peacekeepingand the Challenge of Conflict Resolution. ( New Brunswick: University of New Brunswick. 1994 ) . 81. [ 11 ] Thakur. United Nations Peace Keeping Operations. 170 [ 14 ] David. Peacekeepingand the Challenge of Conflict Resolution. 86. [ 17 ] Fleitz.Peacekeeping Fiascoes. 125. [ 20 ] Frederick H. Fleitz Jr. .Peacekeeping Fiascoes of the ninetiess: Causes. Solution. 125 [ 25 ] Daniel. Donald C. F.U. S. Perspectives on Peacekeeping: Puting PDD-25 in Context. Strategic Research Department. Research Memorandum 3-94. Newport. Rhode island: U. S. Naval War College. 1994. P. 62. [ 27 ] Fleitz. Peace Keeping Fiascos. 127.